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Abstract:
The paper employs different definitions of inequality/ equality and investigates how 
globalisation is associated with these welfare measures. The nations’ proximity to post 
modernism development culture through international cooperation may enable countries 
to strengthen their social, economic, legal and political institutions. We find that adopting 
well developed institutional governance practices as matter of greater integration with 
modern 21st century governance culture creates thriving middle classes in developing 
countries enabling a downward pressure on inequality of incomes and wages. In contrast, 
integration of goods and services with world markets puts upward pressure on the wages 
of skilled in contrast with the unskilled causing industrial wage inequalities in both 
developed and developing countries. The paper recommends in line with the recent 
literature on pre mature de industrialisation phenomenon that countries may protect their 
local industries to provide jobs to locals and thus enable the gains of trade to be more 
equally distributed among the populations. This can be done by choosing the second best 
option towards global integration and that is to promote regionalism within geographical 
clusters. 
Keywords: Globalisation, Governance, Middle Class, Inequality
 ‘No one should be worried about greater inequality so long as everybody’s income is increasing. 
It is only with incomes of those who are poor that economists need to be concerned: This is an 
argument not infrequently heard. As some one who has worked on the issues of inequality for more than twenty 
years, I had had a chance to see it expressed quite a few times.’ (Milanovic, 2003: 2) 
1. Introduction
Today it has become cliché to say that the world is a global village. One may ask, what 
are the social and economic characteristics of this global village when around the globe, 
information is just a click away for individuals or is increasingly available to them via 
their local, regional or global media outlets? As one looks through the eyes of the media, 
it seems that the world is ever dividing into conflicting political and social ideologies as 
different interest groups strive for different realities. Nevertheless here one can safely say 
that economics has been resolute to bring a single mutually acceptable point of reference 
to different stakeholders; connecting the concepts of fair globalisation with economic 
empowerment, freedom of speech, human rights and preservation of environment. 
Unlike in business ethics, in economics, not all is about profit making, but about 
maintaining efficiency while harnessing social harmony. 
However, what is good economics is still a question to be given a wholesome answer. 
Economic freedom has leaded the world closer in many ways. One way is that global 
inequalities have become evident more than ever. The world is more dividing not only on 
basis of mere ideologies but more importantly there is unequal distribution of economic 
gains. Developed countries have gained more in recent decades than developing 
countries. But they also trade among each other freely and enjoy precedence of good 
institutions with populations who are on average more educated than the populations in 
developing countries. Developing countries on the other hand suffer from 
underdeveloped institutions and trade and commerce is still in many cases (i.e., Sub 
Saharan Africa) an underdeveloped concept and more so because of the presence of 
many internal conflicts based on ethnicity, language or religion. On average, developing 
countries are hostile among each other when compared to developed countries and that 
can be the legacy of cold war which ended in 1991 with dismantling of Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR).1
Irrespective of negative fallout of cold war, and with the end of it in 1990s, a new era 
started which is now better known as the post Washington consensus period, which saw 
an increased call of globalisation by asking developing countries to decrease their 
protection in order to be an integral part of a growing global demand and supply chains. 
More trade and economic cooperation among developed and developing countries had 
been seen as one of the best ways through which incomes in developing countries would 
converge to the levels of their developed counterparts. The focus of recipes of 
development ever since had been on income generation. The question of distribution of 
incomes was largely never asked only until recently when there is a significant rise in 
global income inequality (i.e. see Milanovic, 2006; and Wade, 2004; for a detailed 
discussion on global income inequality).  Rise in global inequalities is seen to be linked 
with prevalent inequalities among different strata of population within countries which 
stifle the potential of a country to grow or converge. (A discussion of intra-country 
inequality has already been carried out in chapter 3, and which is the focus of the larger 
thesis and this chapter also). 
In most of the last 20 years, the criterion of good economic policy and the barometer of 
good governance focused itself on their effects on per capita income growth in 
developing countries.  Economic efficiency models were transferred to many developing 
countries who had become adherents to the Washington consensus. Structural 
Adjustment Plan (SAP) is the most well known one of the recommended programs of 
economic development, which has been implemented in many developing countries with 
the help of Bretton Woods’s institutions like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
As per the good advice of Bretton Woods’s institutions and in an effort to achieve 
economic efficiency, most developing countries dismantled their barriers to international 
trade in goods and services during the last 20 years. As a result, the size of world trade in 
goods and services dramatically increased. Success stories also emerged as an outcome of 
contemporary globalisation. China and India, witnessed unprecedented rise in their 
1 High military expenditures as a proportion to GDP in many developing countries indicates towards 
prevalent internal or external conflict, while high military expenditures are born at the cost of public 
exchequer by crowding out much needed development expenditures. 
growth rates as well as significant poverty alleviation. However, for most countries, 
globalisation came with mixed experiences.  Despite integration to the world economy, 
most countries of Latin America, Africa (sub-Saharan) and some in Asia failed to 
accomplish decent growth rates. In many countries in the South, poverty increased. Even 
if some grew at a decent rate, they failed to put a downward pressure on the increasing 
trends in poverty levels. For example, Pakistan, which recently witnessed a growth rate of 
eight per cent, has also witnessed increase in poverty levels from 30 per cent to 35 per 
cent as of 2005. Even in China and India, the falling poverty trends are not sustainable, 
as there is evidence of rapidly rising inequalities. 
Irrespective of rising trends of poverty in some developing countries and rising 
within country inequalities in some, a more important fact is that many developing 
countries encountered conditions of severe economic collapse amid Structural 
Adjustment Plans. These include mostly the countries in Latin America like Argentina 
who embraced free market ideology far more intensively than any other country in the 
developing world. Surprisingly, Argentina had historically been far more developed per 
capita wise than countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, or regions like Sub 
Saharan Africa or Mena countries, but instead of converging to the developed country 
incomes their path to development has seriously been hampered by significant economic 
collapse post 1980s economic reforms and they are stagnating ever since, still struggling 
with one macro-economic crises after another.
Where did they go wrong may tell a whole lot about where do most developing 
countries have gone wrong? It is a story of good policies but bad timing. The policies fail 
because larger determinants of development are not taken into account. A focus on 
income generation without looking at prevalent institutions may lead to economic 
disaster. Mamoon and Murshed (2017) have shown that institutions are as important as 
good economic policies (i.e. trade policy). Though the focus in chapter 2 was on income 
and its determinants, the debate needs to be extended to income distribution which can 
then capture such unequal outcomes which prevent some segments of the societies from 
gaining goods of economic gains (rising per capita income). In developing countries, 
other than being poor of the poorest, many are relatively poorer than the others because 
they are economically and socially excluded because of their ethnic origin, religion or 
geographical region. It is observed that when these developing countries generate more 
incomes through policies like integration, the incomes are further distributed un-equally. 
This is the same phenomenon as global inequality; where some countries (regions) of 
the world have gained less than the other countries because of their geographical 
location, underdeveloped institutions or mere lack of economic capability (because of the 
presence of deep rooted informal markets). As mentioned above, with the exception of 
China and India, more developing countries have failed to alleviate poverty even though 
they have witnessed some short to medium term spurts in per capita income growth 
rates. The poor remained poor but rich got richer. Has income inequality prevented 
growth to trickle down to the poor?
In this retrospect, the problem of poverty cannot be separated from the way in which 
growth is achieved. Other than economic growth, what is the point of reference to 
economic development, especially when it is about ensuring equity? 
Under global processes of production, where trading societies learn and coordinate 
among each other to find common ground for carrying out contemporary social norms 
that fit international standards and where business protects labour rights, promotes 
gender sensitivity, brings efficient social welfare systems while following best commerce 
practices, there are not one but a myriad combination of common institutions, which 
simultaneously play a role in facilitating each country’s smooth exposure to global 
markets and international competition. Thus, it is important to look at the different 
institutional structures countries may have while working along with the surge of 
globalisation.
One of the most commonly quoted institutional factors for determining any 
country’s intellectual, social, economic and cultural progress is the notion of democracy. 
Since all developed nations are well-practiced democracies, this notion generally forms 
the popular opinion that democracy is the first step to any country’s progress. However 
to change the kaleidoscope a bit, one may also argue that it is their very own economic 
progress that has been able to sustain democracy in the West. It is a well-developed 
combination of social, legal, political and economic institutions, which has worked in an 
intricate net of coordination to sustain western economic progress, thus enabling the 
region to maintain its scientific niche. Where did the West really start it all? There are 
different answers for different times. To go down a timeline, say a hundred years, 
western economic progress links to colonialism, which was an act of resource 
exploitation and dictatorial precedence in the garb of monarchies rather than following 
any course of democratic values. Today western economic models work under the prime 
of information accuracy and thus keep their edge over other regions based on their 
enhanced level of technology. 
In developing countries, there is evidence of rapid economic progress leading to 
democracy or moving towards democratically aligned economic models of governance. 
China, South Korea and Taiwan have been growing under one-party dictatorships, the 
last two eventually turning completely to democracy. Today China is for the first time 
seriously emphasising property rights, to protect private ownership, within its own 
borders. Among the transition economies, Kazakhstan under Nazarbaev achieved rapid 
economic growth. Here one may assume that these countries performed well under 
market-friendly policies and thus successfully achieved robust economic performance. 
However, the analogy is not that simple and mere good economics is not enough to 
sustain economic progress. 
 In 2003, Pakistan had become one of the fastest growing economies in South Asia, 
even surpassing India, under General Musharraf, and finally moving towards democracy 
while for the first time in Pakistan’s politically chequered history, nearly all political 
parties accepted the electoral verdict as an outcome of free and fair elections. However, 
the increase in political instability in the last years of Musharraf rule has already stifled the 
growth rates in the country and currently an economic and political crisis is looming 
asking whether the good policies of the dictators are sustainable or whether autocratic 
rules corrupt the prevalent institutions, irrespective of a possibility of short term 
economic good will, such that the period, which represents transition to democracy , 
would be mired with political upheavals which would eventually cause economic 
collapse. Sometimes, democratic transitions are risky and produce bad economic 
outcomes. (See Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005; for a detailed discussion on this). 
 
Thus market-friendly policies may not work in the absence of good institutions. In 
Russia, the lack of a supportive legal, regulatory and political apparatus has been 
responsible for the failure of the economy and its reform process. In Latin America, little 
attention paid to the mechanisms of social insurance and to the safety nets has resulted in 
dissatisfaction with market-oriented reforms. India, in comparison to the countries 
mentioned above, is not only the largest democracy in the world in terms of population, 
but the country is also one of the fastest growing economies in the world with a 
precedence of sound legal institutions. Due to robust legal institutions, the country is 
politically less volatile when compared to its neighbour Pakistan, even though both 
countries have seen an emergence of multiparty governance setups. However, because 
they are developing countries, much like those in Latin America, social institutions are 
underdeveloped, which means that a well-meaning democracy may not exist in India 
until economic progress reaches out to the masses and benefits the impoverished 
peripheries. It may also be the case that some institutions may be more important than 
others may. For example, even pro-market dictators can secure property rights as a 
matter of policy choice (Glaeser 2004a). Similarly, stronger social institutions lead to 
improved government functioning: ‘Education is needed for courts to operate and to 
empower citizens to engage with government institutions.’ (Ibid 2004: 3)
Why market friendly policies may fail to work under developing countries? To 
achieve higher growth rates, economic freedom is a pre-requisite condition. Usually, 
economic freedom is determined by good economic policies, which as discussed above 
can be very well a prerogative of good leadership rather than good institutions, especially 
in case of developing countries. The fundamentals of good economic policies lie in 
promotion of private sector by implementing rules like private property rights and 
decreasing the burden of public exchequer.  However, in developing countries the private 
gains may fail to follow equal distribution because of the presence of deep rooted social, 
ethnic and regional inequalities.  Only a democratic structure or prevalence of sound 
social, political and legal institutions may ensure or promote equal opportunities to 
private gains in unequal societies. 
 
Thus reliance of economic growth by giving more weight to short term growth 
strategies is to promote a half baked development recipe which is bound to fail.  Most 
governments have focussed on macro-economic gains. That is why policy advice post 
Washington Consensus on structural adjustment had a blind following by most 
developing countries, without asking whether good macro-economics is a sufficient 
condition for good development. Globalisation accused if increasing poverty as well as 
inequality in many countries, due to numerous cases of growth collapse. While at the 
same time, many suggest that the developing countries have not done enough to avoid 
disaster.  Under the dynamic Hecksher-Ohlin model discussed in chapter 3, it may be 
that developing countries can not do enough under the biased competition environment 
prevailing in international markets due to certain protectionary policies of developed 
nations which is much evident by the political economy of the WTO (World Trade 
Organisation. (Stiglitz, 2006) Good economic policy advice has to accommodate 
indigenous limitation of each country. Currently international initiatives like WTO are 
becoming a symbol of protection than promoter of equal competition opportunities and 
the bias is seen in favour of the developed countries partly because the negative fall out 
of globalisation has been felt even in developed countries as most rich and middle-
income countries are experiencing rising economic inequality generated by skill-biased 
technological change, international trade and other factors related to globalisation. 
(Smeeding 2002):
For India and China, it is equal distribution of economic gains which has become more 
relevant in recent times, while in Latin American countries like Argentina and Brazil, 
growth and distribution go hand in hand. So what are the key characteristics which 
matter equally good to income generation and re-distribution of income? 
In developing countries, income inequalities can be affected in two ways. (1) Adopt 
policies which have a redistributive outcome by shifting gains from rich to the poor. (2) 
Or raise the share of income in sectors which mostly employ the poorer segments of the 
society. Both institutions and trade may have a strong redistributive power.  For example, 
democracies, as against, oligarchic societies redistribute resources equally to all sections 
of the society. In a real democratic set-up voice of farmers and industry workers are 
weighed equally and policies are structured to raise the share of income for both 
manufacturing and farm industry. Outcomes like increased accountability, preservation 
of property rights and control for corruption may all have redistributive power. Trade 
can also lead to redistribution if developing countries are able to trade more in 
agriculture produce in international markets thus raising the returns to agriculture sector. 
However, if developing countries fail to compete in international markets, governments 
may adopt regulation policies which can protect their labour. The scope of protection of 
agriculture sector in developing countries by means of trade policy measures is limited.  
Nevertheless. However, more exports in agriculture is necessary for economic 
empowerment of the rural population whose livelihoods are directly connected with the 
performance of agriculture sector. Protection of agriculture sector is very common in 
developed countries, while it has been negatively affecting the farmers in developing 
countries. To remedy this problem, developing countries can increase trade among each 
in labor intensive agriculture produce causing rise in income share of agriculture in 
economic growth.  Government measures such as subsidies can also be utilised to 
improve on farm activities. Subsidies on pesticides and alike, can improve the produce of 
agriculture sector significantly improving the livelihoods in rural areas So it is a 
combination of good institutions and trade, which eventually leads to inequality 
mitigation and redistribution.  
To analyse what makes for good economics where not only economic growth is 
achieved but most importantly economic dividends are also distributed equally among 
different strata of the population, this paper conducts a cross-sectional analysis of 
developed and developing countries as a follow-up of Mamoon and Murshed (2017). In 
this paper also, different institutional variables, along with different proxies of 
openness\trade policy are employed while focussing on their impact on inequality. 
2. Inequality as Important as Growth 
After the surge of colonialism, the world became a land of unequal opportunities. The 
last century witnessed global inequalities partly lead to regional inequalities; and with the 
return of contemporary globalisation, post-modernism brought inequality to the 
doorstep of each country. Where rural and urban divides have been ever increasing so 
that it recently became of policy importance to consider inequality as a significant factor 
that may stifle growth promoting strategies and even reverse what good growth may 
bring to society. Income inequality has become as important as issue as per capita 
income growth because over the last twenty years it is observed that the distributions in 
poor, middle income and rich countries have grown more unequal.
To account for inequality trends recently observed in developing countries, one may 
start with observations of high levels of inequalities in most countries of Latin America. 
For example, due in part to the recession in the 1980s, which hit the poor harder than 
the rich, inequality in most Latin American countries, except three (Colombia, Uruguay 
and Costa Rica), witnessed sharp rises. Gini coefficients in Latin America ranged 
between 0.45 and 0.60 since the early 1950s, which are among the highest in the world. 
The severe polarisation of income has been due to highly unequal distribution of land 
and educational opportunities. (Cornia et al. 2004). These prevalent inequalities are still 
stifling the economic potential of the region while institutions remain underdeveloped. 
In China, income concentration has been rising rapidly since 1985 so that the Gini 
coefficient reached 0.43 by 1995 and remained more or less at the same level until 
recently. The widening of the urban-rural divide from faster expansion of urban activities 
amid China’s active participation in international markets is responsible for the rise in 
income disparity. Among South-East Asian economies, the Gini coefficient for 
Indonesia increased to 0.38 by 1997 from 0.32 in 1987-90. In South Asia, inequality also 
followed a U-shape pattern, although less pronounced. In India, the experience of the 
1990s points to a moderate rise in both urban and rural inequality and a larger rise in 
overall inequality due to a widening gap between urban and rural areas. In the 1990s, 
urban inequality rose to 0.36. The Gini coefficient in Pakistan rose from 0.39 in the 
1960s to 0.41 in the 1990s. Much like India, the sharp rise in rural inequalities resulted in 
the rise in overall inequality. Inequality in sub-Saharan Africa has been among the highest 
in the world. There is some evidence of a falling urban-rural gap but there is rising intra-
urban and at times intra-rural inequalities. For example in Tanzania, the Gini coefficient 
for rural inequality rose from 0.53 in the early 1980s to 0.76 in the early 1990s. Similarly 
for Kenya, the rural inequalities increased by nine points from 1980 to 1992 and stands at 
0.49. (Ibid 2004)
Rise in inequality is not only a developing country phenomemon: ‘Canada excepted, 
all the countries of English settlement, led by the United States, have experienced big 
increases in income inequality over the past 20-30 years. In the United States, the top 1% 
of the families enjoyed a growth of after-tax income of almost 160 % over 1979-97, 
while families in the midldle of the distribution had a 10% increase. Within the top 1% 
most of the gains have been concentrated in the top 0.1%. This is not a matter of reward 
to education. Inequality has expanded hugely among the college-educated. Whatever the 
causes, the fact is that the United States is now back to the same level of inequality of 
income as in the decades before1929, the era of the “robber barons” and the Great 
Gatsby. Income distribution in the United Kingdom grew more unequal more quikly 
than even in the United States during the 1980s, and is now the most unequal of the big 
European countries.’ (Wade, 2004; 12). 
3. Different Types of Institutions, Integration, Inequality and the 
Endogeneity Factors
There are different measures of inequality which may determine within country inequality 
and they have been widely discussed in recent literature. (See for example Wade, 2004; 
Milanovic, 2006). Most studies concentrate on the positive or negative effects of 
globalisation or integration on income distribution while employing diverse proxies of 
income distribution. Not many studies concentrate on the effects of institutions on 
inequality. There is a need to simultaneously model the effects of institutions and 
integration on income distribution. However, before any such analysis is carried out 
potential endogenieties between integration and institutions needs to be addressed, so 
that a statistically valid model is estimated. This section captures the inter connection 
between institutions, integration and inequality. 
Figure 1 Endogeneity between institutions, integration and inequality
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There are issues of two-way causality between inequality and institutions (see Keefer and 
Knack 2002; Chong and Gradstein 2004), and between different types of institutions as 
shown by Figure 1 and discussed below. Many recent studies (see Chen and Ravallion 
2003; Cockburn 2001; Friedman 2000; Lofgren 1999), show that international trade 
relates significantly to inequality while institutions and integration are also endogenous. 
(Rodrik et al. 2004) Any empirical analysis that takes institutions as a purely exogenous 
factor while analysing its effects on inequality may lead to mis-specification bias. Here 
one can conveniently assume that geography is a purely endogenous concept which may 
determine the distribution of income as effectively as it explains differences in per capita 
income growth rates. 
Easterly (2001) and Keefer and Knack (2002) suggest that social polarisation negatively 
affects institutional quality. For example, rising inequalities may lead to political instability 
and even civil unrest. Chong and Gradstein (2004) find strong evidence of bidirectional 
causality between institutions and inequality. Inequality may affect the quality of 
institutions. For example high inequality will prevent the poor from investing in 
education or the ruling class may not invest in education so that the poor majority will 
not be politically active, thus undermining the development of necessary social and 
political institutions: ‘High inequality can impede the economic performance of a country by 
obstructing the formation of governance structures that enhance productivity. Where this is 
the case, inequality is likely to be the result of a distribution of property rights that is 
inefficient as well as inequitable. If so, there may be a plausible set of alternative distributions 
that are both more equitable and more efficient; i.e., which foster competition on the basis of 
a more level playing field.’ (Roy and Weeks 2003: 3) 
Brink (2008) also emphasised on addressing inequalities in a society to enable the 
institutions work better: ‘ Even the best institutions require (some more than others, 
depending not so much on their quality as on their design) a personal investment on the part 
of the claimant, sufficient to overcome the resistance of the respondent. Some basic 
capability on the part of the claimant is a precondition for the effective exercise of rights. 
Secondly, institutions are the result of political struggles that also require the investment of 
substantial personal resources, sufficient to overcome the resistance of those who can 
anticipate their consequences and would be adversely affected by them. Both the 
development and the operation of institutions respond to the core inequalities present in 
society. Until those inequalities are addressed, it is unlikely that a full democratic rule of law 
will take hold’ (p23)
The countries with poor institutions are also likely to have high inequality. For 
example in Russia in the 1990s, a small group of entrepreneurs were successful in 
exploiting their political clout to promote their own interests, subverting the emergence 
of institutions committed to the protection of smaller shareholders and businesses. 
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International, 
among the transition economies, Estonia is 28 and Hungary 31; whereas Russia is 79 and 
Ukraine 83. In these transition economies, poor performance of public institutions, 
absence of effective implementation on property rights, and presence of business 
regulation which favour of influential parties, absence of trust in the courts to resolve 
business disputes, tax evasion and higher levels of rent seeking have strong correlation 
with high inequality in the society. (Hellman and Kaufman 2002) Similarly, in several 
Latin American countries, the ruling elites, the military and large businesses impeded 
smaller business interests giving rise to significant informal sector. Chong and Gradstein 
(2004), show that when the political bias in favour of the rich is large, income inequality 
and poor institutional quality may reinforce each other, indicating endogeneity between 
the two.
There may also be inter-linkages between various institutions. For example, nearly all 
developed countries are democracies and most developing countries are one-party 
systems, dictatorships or military regimes. The countries with lower levels of economic 
and human development tend to have lower levels of education, limited political rights, 
weak or non-existent political competition, lower level of economic freedom and 
openness, ethno-linguistic factionalism, lack of judicial independence and a free press, 
and high levels of permissiveness towards corruption.
 
Table 1. Different Kinds of Institutions
Institutions What they Capture
Political Institutions: Political stability, democracy, the separation of 
powers 
Legal Institutions: Laws and their enforcements
Economic Institutions: Promotion of private wealth
Social Institutions: Human motivations and social structure.
Before discussing in detail the interdependence of different institutions, it is 
important first to differentiate between them. There are four types of institutions 
identified: legal, political, economic and social (Williamson, 1999). A hierarchy of 
institutions are presented in table 1.  Social institutions capture socioeconomic conditions 
such as health, education and nutrition and can be analogous to human capital which has 
basis in its historic evolution. For example the reference of Glaeser et al (2004a) towards 
the endogeniety between AJR settler mortality with settlers’ human capital is one 
indication of long run transformation of social institution in developing countries. Legal 
institutions capture the transparency and fairness of the legal system, preservation of 
political rights of the citizens, state legitimacy, freedom of speech, independence of 
judiciary, enforceability of contracts, police effectiveness, access to independent and 
impartial courts, confidence in judicial system in insuring property rights, prevention of 
improper practices in public sphere, control of corruption and so on. Political institutions 
represent political stability, democracy, autocracy or dictatorship or rules which promote 
political process, civil liberties and political rights. Economic institutions comprise state 
effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue. As well as, the 
ability to create, deliver and maintain vital national infrastructure, the ability to respond 
effectively to domestic economic problems; independence of government economic 
policies from pressure of special interest groups, trade and foreign exchange; competition 
policy, privatisation, banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities and non-
bank financial institutions.
The legal, political, economic and social institutions are strong in developed countries 
while developing countries have mixed experiences. For example, the US and most 
advanced societies vigorously protect intellectual property rights, but this is not the case 
in many developing countries. (Rodrik 1999) Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) link the 
development of public education, as a social institution, to democratisation as a political 
process in the US. They argue that while starting at a similar level of development in the 
18th century, the US led the way in setting up a system of common schools and 
promoting literacy, whereas countries in South America and the Caribbean delayed 
implementing these processes. Gupta et al. (1998) find that if government officials use 
their authority for private gain and indulge in corruption, it affects the effectiveness of 
social spending and the formation of human capital by perpetuating an unequal 
distribution of asset ownership and unequal access to education. Corruption also affects 
government effectiveness as it weakens tax administration and can lead to tax evasion 
and improper tax exemptions. Higher corruption is associated with increased inequalities 
in education, land distribution and health spending. Wealthy urban elites can lobby the 
government for biased social expenditure towards higher education and tertiary health, 
which tends to benefit high-income groups. (Ibid 1998)
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variables Code Source Obs Std . Dev
Dependent
GINI Coefficient in Percentage Points as 
calculated by WIDER, 1995
Gini UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID)
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
117 (35.00)
UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure, 
1999
Theil99 University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) 
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu
155 (0.099)
Lowest income decile,  1995
Low10 UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID)
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
117 (1.05)
Fifth income percentile/ First income 
percentile , 1995
High20/ 
Low20
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID)
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
117 (2.28)
Third income percentile, 1995 Thrd20 UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID)
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
117 (2.22)
Highest income decile, 1995 High10 UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID)
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm
117 (7.50)
Endogenous Independent
Openness Variables
(Exports +Imports)/GDP at current dollar 
prices, 1985
Lcopen World Development Indicators 170 (0.589)
Import Penetration: overall, 1985 Impnov85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (21.08)
Import Penetration: overall, 1982 Impnov82 Pritchett (1996) 95 (23.85)
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1985 Tars85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (36.91)
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1982 Tars82 Pritchett (1996) 93 (83.10)
Trade Policy Variables
Import duties as % imports,1985 Tariffs World Development Indicators 99 (8.903)
Tariffs on international inputs and capital 
goods, 1985
Owti Sachs and Warner (1995) 98 (0.165
Trade taxes/ trade, 1982 Txtrdg Pritchett (1996) 54 (0.031)
Weighted average of total import charges, 
1985
Totimpov85 Pritchett (1996)
(Available for developing countries only)
76 (21.30)
Non trade barriers frequency on intermediate 
inputs, 1985
Owqi Sachs and Warner (1995) 96 (0.24)
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: overall, 1987 Nontarr87 Pritchett (1996)
(Available for developing countries only)
76 (36.305)
Sachs and Warner’s composite openness index, 
1980
Open80s Edwards (1998) 61 (0.446)
Institutions
Political
Voice and Accountability, 1999 Range: 2.5 to -
2.5
Va Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2003)
170 (0.952)
Political stability, 1999
Range: 2.5 to -2.5
Ps Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2003)
156 (0.954)
Democracy, 2000
Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high), Democracy 
Score: general openness of political 
institutions. The 11-point Democracy scale is 
constructed additively
Demo Polity IV dataset) 123 (4.33)
Autocracy
Range = 0 to -10 (0 = low; -10 = high), general 
closeness of political institutions. The 11-point 
autocracy scale is constructed additively
Auto Polity IV dataset) 123 (3.69)
Legal
Rule of Law, 1999
Range: 2.5 to -2.5
Rl Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2003)
166 (0.937)
Control for Corruption, 1999
Range: 2.5 to -2.5
Ctc Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2003)
159 (0.910)
Economic
Government effectiveness, 1999
Range: 2.5 to -2.5
Ge Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2003)
157 (0.893)
Regulatory quality, 1999
Range: 2.5 to -2.5
Rq Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2003)
166 (0.892)
Social
Average years of Schooling, 1999 Sch99 Baro and Lee (2001) 109 (2.914)
Instruments
Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares 
computed from a bilateral trade equation with 
‘pure geography’ variables,
Lfrkrom Frankel and Romer (1999) 163 (16.75)
Fraction of the population speaking English Engfrac Hall and Jones (1999) 182 (0.236)
Fraction of the population speaking one of the 
major languages of Western Europe: French, 
German, Portugese or Spanish
Eurfrac Hall and Jones (1999) 185 (0.380)
Drop out rate, 1990s Drop90 Barro and Lee (1996) 125 (0.802)
Number of school days Schday Barro and Lee (1996) 139 (23.43)
Distance from the equator of capital city 
measured as abs (Latitude)/90
Disteq Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR) (2001) 208 (16.65)
Furthermore, trade opening in societies with weak institutions may lead to worse 
economic policies. (Segura-Cayuela 2005) For example, those transition economies that 
implemented trade reforms slowly and where government institutions were able to 
perform well with time, smaller increases in inequality and smaller output decline 
occurred. However, the transition economies with weak government structures 
performed as ‘passive globalisers’ and the trade-to-GDP ratios in them were quite high, 
partly accounting for capital flight, while poverty and inequality increased. (Yudaeva 
2002)
Inequalities may lead to political upheavals against globalisation and integration. 
Some developing countries may trade with developed countries because of common 
polity, whereas some countries cannot effectively trade because there lays ideological 
differences between governance structures. For example, despite Iran being an Oil rich 
country, do not trade with United States or Israel on ideological grounds while it may 
establish stronger trade relations with the competitors of United States e.g. Russia and 
Venezuela. Conflict and political instability also cause countries to trade less effectively 
with rest of the world causing negative externalities in terms of increased costs of trade. 
For-example Pakistan and India, despite being neighbours, have a history of conflict, and 
they do not trade with each other more, despite high costs incurred in terms of 
competitions and economic rivalry. India is traditionally a democracy, while Pakistan has 
scored usually low in democracy. Thus there is a strong correlation between inequality 
and trade through institutions. 
4. Data and Methodology 
The six governance indicators utilised in Mamoon and Murshed(2017) are the same 
employed here for the analysis. They are categorised as rule of law (Rl), political stability 
(Ps), regulatory quality (Rq), government effectiveness (Ge), voice and accountability (Va) 
and control of corruption (Ctc). This chapter divides them into four classifications based 
on their definitions considering Rl, and Ctc as legal institutions. Ge and Rq  are economic 
institutions whereas  Va and Ps is a proxy for Political institutions. This analysis adds two 
more political indicators namely, democracy (Demo) and autocracy (Auto) to the analysis 
from Polity dataset whereas, both range from 0 to 10. The analysis also includes average 
schooling years in the total population at 25 (Sch)) in order to capture the quality of social 
institutions. 
As mentioned above, international trade is also a significant determinant of 
inequalities in countries across the globe; integration enters the regression model to 
enhance its explanatory power, while we can also test whether globalisation is a cause to 
rising inequalities. This paper incorporates not one but eight various concepts of 
integration based on outcome as well as incidence based measures of trade barriers. The 
ratio of nominal imports plus exports to GDP (lcopen) is the conventional openness 
indicator. Two other measures of openness are overall trade penetration (tarshov) derived 
from the World Bank’s TARS system and overall import penetration (Impnov) 
respectively. Import tariffs as percentage of imports (Tariffs), tariffs on intermediate 
inputs and capital goods (Owti), trade taxes as a ratio of overall trade (Txtrg) and total 
import charges (Totimpov) can all be considered as good proxies for trade restrictiveness 
and have also been employed in this study. Other measures that capture restrictions in 
overall trade are non-tariff barriers. Overall non-tariff coverage (Ntarfov) and non-tariff 
barriers on intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owqi) are used here as two proxies for 
non-tariff barriers. Sachs and Warner’s (1995) openness index (Open80) is utilised as a 
composite measure of trade policy.
First, comparable and consistent measures of income inequality, whether on a 
household level or per head basis are difficult, almost implausible and generally fail to 
provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and cross-country coverage.  For example, 
between-country world PPP income inequality using per capita GDPs, equal country 
weights (China=Uganda), through a GINI estimate has been found to have increased 
since 1980s.  However between country world PPP income inequality with countries 
weighted by population has been found to be constant or falling since around 1980s.(see 
Wade, 2004).  For this, recent literature on income inequality prefers global income 
inequality indicator over country specific ones (see Milanovic, 2006). However we are 
more interested in country specific effects of inequality to differentiate between 
developed and developing countries. To capture income inequality this chapter employs 
GINI income inequality index (Gini) for both developed and developing countries from 
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID). 
However, there are many issues revolving around the calculation of GINI index 
which have also been presented in some detail in WIDER User Guide (2008): ‘There are 
no easy ways to use income/consumption distribution data. Unlike national accounts 
data which are in principle comparable across countries, there is no agreed basis of 
definition for the construction of distribution data. Sources and methods might vary, 
especially across but within countries. This may be the case even if the data comes from 
the same source. In their influential article on the use of secondary data in studies on 
income distribution, Atkinnson and Brandolini (2001) discuss quality and consistency in 
income distribution data both within and across countries. They show how both levels 
and trends in distributional data can be affected by data choices. In light of this, it is not 
easy task to construct a secondary database with distribution data………Regardless of 
different views, the collection of inequality observations is restricted to what in practice is 
available. In most industrialised countries inequality and poverty are assessed with 
reference to income, not consumption (Deaton and Zaid, 2002). This tradition is 
followed in much of Latin America. By contrast, most Asian and African surveys have 
always collected detailed consumption data. The fact that distribution data can be based 
on both income and consumption is the first step stone in the construction of 
comparable statistics. In WIID (reference to WIDER data base) we strived to collect 
observations with reference to both income and consumption, whenever possible.’  (p.4)
These are introductory lines of the user manual which have quite nicely summarised 
the problem faced with the collection of comparable data to construct within country 
GINI index across a set of countries.  To address this critique of data problem faced 
with the measures of income distribution, this chapter has also employed other concepts 
of inequality. UTIP-UNIDO Theil measure (Theil) calculated by the University of Texas 
Inequality Project (UTIP) captures wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour 
in manufacturing pay sector and available for both developed and developing countries. 
Several factors motivate this decision. On the data methodological front manufacturing 
pay, based on UNIDO Industrial Statistics provides indicators of inequality that are more 
stable, more reliable and more comparable across countries because UNIDO measures 
are based on a two or three digit code of International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC), a single systematic accounting framework. Furthermore, for nearly 40 years most 
countries around the world have measured manufacturing pay with reasonable accuracy 
as a matter of official routine. (Galbraith and Kum 2002). However, literature also relates 
rise in wage inequality with the behaviour of relative factor supplies (see Acemoglu, 
2003).  
The same study, nevertheless, indicates that changes in relative demand may also 
cause changes in relative sill premia, through at least four distinct effects:
1. Own technology development by different countries with different degrees of 
skill bias.
2. Lack of technical capabilities in some countries to adapt to most recent skilled-
bias technologies.
3. Efficiency in adoption of more skilled biased technologies from a global 
technology frontier. 
4. Different trading regimes with different levels of trade opening affecting the 
demand of skills differentially. 
Different degrees of skill bias, or a countries potential to adapt to most recent skilled bias 
technologies or its efficiency in choosing skilled bias technologies from global technology 
frontier may all be determined by prevalent institutions. For-example, efficient economic 
and political institutions would enable the countries to adopt or benefit from skill biased 
technologies thus raising the demand for skills. This can all be done to achieve better 
growth rates. For-example, countries like India and China, where a significant population 
has been educated and skilled in urban clusters, a skilled bias technical progress is 
underway. This factor has resulted in outsourcing of jobs from the developed countries 
to India and china’s business capitals. The skill premia has significantly gone up, while 
the relative price of low skilled has fallen down. For-example within the manufacturing 
sector, low skilled wage usually rise at a far less proportion than skilled labor wage. In 
most cases, the low skill wage is stagnant because of excess supply of low skilled. The 
excess supply is sustained by continuously increasing trends of migration from rural to 
urban. 
Some studies argue that international trade play a limited role in the increase in the 
relative demand for skills (see i.e., Acemoglu 2002). However, such works focus more on 
wage patterns in developed countries and the evidence of trade in determining skill 
premia for developed countries is limited since they are leaders in technology whereas 
technology leaders may not generally import new technologies from other countries and 
thus technical change for all such technology leaders is an indigenous process. The skill 
biased technical diffusion effect through trade in developed countries is only possible 
when they trade among each other. However, for the larger world, which mostly 
comprises of developing countries, trade is one of the significant sources of technical 
change especially in the presence of lax intellectual property rights. Acemoglu (2002) 
suggest that most developing countries are in any case unprepared to utilise most of the 
technologies adopted by developed countries and thus the scope of technical change 
through trading with developed countries remain very limited. Here the case of China 
and India may refute this hypothesis as they have been able to adopt and transfer 
relatively sophisticated technologies. In recent times, more and more Indian and Chinese 
enterprises are appearing in the list fortune 500 companies. Further opening up of India 
and China to world markets post 1990 has brought significant technical change in both 
countries which must have a significant relationship with a rise in skill premia. Currently 
many Indian multinationals are incorporating new technologies for indigenous use.  For 
example, TATA has been offering to build the cheapest car in the world, the production 
of which has only been delayed because of relocation of production plant to another 
location due to a dispute over procured land for the plant in State of Bengal. However, 
one should also note here that early grounds were prepared in India and China in 1970s 
and 1980s by practicing high protection of industrial sector to catch up to new 
technologies which are increasingly practiced today in businesses. With skill bias technical 
change, both countries have witnesses rise in skill premia as India and China are 
emerging as technology leaders among other less developed countries in Asia. 
Acemoglu (2002) scepticism over trade than technical change affecting skill premia is 
more of an empirical contention and especially for the case of U.S. In another paper 
though, Acemoglu (1999), already introduce a dynamic model to discuss the possibility of 
rise in skill premia for both developed and developing countries due to trade between 
each other which would bring additional technological diffusion effect to developing 
countries and skill-biased technical change in developed countries. The paper explains its 
motivation in favour of rise in relative wage inequality among skilled and unskilled, due 
to trade between developed and developing countries, by incorporating technical change 
as the dynamic externality: ‘increased international trade will have an effect on skill 
premia by changing the nature of technologies that are being developed, as well as its 
more direct standard effect. Under most plausible circumstances, trade between U.S and 
the LDCs (Least Developed Countries) will induce skill-biased technical change in the 
U.S., and will cause a large increase in U.S. skill premia. Contra to the standard models, 
this induced technology effect also implies that trade may increase skill premia in the 
LDCs’. (p.26)
Similarly, by drawing comparison of globalisation with soccer, Milanovic (2003b) comes 
up with an interesting analogy which can partly explain the skill bias in high growth 
oriented manufacturing sector activities across the globe and its unequal outcomes within 
countries. As in soccer today where the quality of the game has arisen with the rise in 
players’ skills with matching salaries and where best players are paired to only play with 
those who are also among the best; to compete in global markets, countries have to raise 
the share of skills (good jobs) in their population to match the skills (good jobs) in the 
developed countries because skilled intensive production activities may only take place 
where appropriate skills are present and these activities in addition to directly benefiting 
these skills with a high premium, also benefit the country through technology spill over 
effects which improves the growth potential of the country. India and China have 
successfully transformed a significant portion of population which can match the rising 
global skill demand (good jobs) and thus these skilled labor are directly benefiting from 
globalisation. The solution can vary. In the short run, one solution is to protect low wage 
labor through regulations such that high wage (good) jobs and low-wage (bad) jobs can 
co-exist. (Acemoglu, 2001a) 
As contended by Acemoglu (2002), United States and United Kingdom, who are leaders 
in technology among other developed nations, have been witnessing a rise in skill premia 
which in contrast to India and China may not have lot to do with international trade. 
However, the downward pressure on the relative wages of lower skilled is partly 
attributed to job outsourcing to developing countries by many business enterprises 
located in these Western technology leaders, most of whom have found many urban 
commerce havens in South Asia and East Asia where skilled labour, only relative to local 
market standards, is employed in outsourced job market. However, one may note that 
without efficient technology transfer by developed countries to (or adoption by) the 
developing ones and by already creating skills among strata of urban population through 
investment in education, outsourcing business would not have been a cost efficient one. 
And in the first place, to make technology transfer and adoption possible, trade between 
developed and developing countries have been a pre-requisite. Thus technical bias 
change and trade go hand in hand for both developed and developing countries to 
determine skill premium as is rightly modelled by Acemoglu (1999).  
Trade and Globalisation, may also lead to rise in wage inequality because many 
developing countries pay protection premium to skilled labor in order to pursue a local 
path to technological development. While availability of cheap and relatively unskilled 
labor in global technical frontier may cause a downward pressure on wages of unskilled 
relative to skilled in developed countries as developed countries try to retain their niche 
in technology and more and more economic activity require higher skills which would 
then always follow excess demand of more refined skills in the context of local and 
global factor supply market.   Thus production technologies would always move places 
relative to their skill intensity globally and locally to find cost effective supply of labour 
which best matches their skill requirement. While international trade would provide the 
basic frame work for the very possibility of relocation of these these production 
technologies. In a technology driven world the returns to relative skills would always be 
high irrespective of production location. 
The possibility to find a negative relationship between wage inequality and trade for 
developing countries would come about if trade between them increase, especially among 
countries which are at similar technical frontier but their access to technology is unequal: 
some are ready to adopt more skill biased technologies than the others. A detailed 
discussion of this scenario has already been presented, discussing the trading 
opportunities and its skill bias fallout in presence of economic cooperation between say 
China and Thailand. Further more, by increasing the mean level of education; developing 
countries can offset the negative effects of trade on labor markets. (Mamoon and 
Murshed, 2008). 
And as discussed before, in addition to the trade side, institutional side also play an 
important role. Like income inequality, there may also be a strong connection between 
good institutions and smooth labour markets. Thus such questions are also important: 
Are more educated societies with better legal, political and economic institutions more 
capable to absorb the upward pressure which is put by technical bias on relative factor 
returns? Does the presence of good institutions form grounds for technical change with 
overall fewer distortions in labor market returns? If yes then good institutions would be 
expected to put a down ward pressure on wage inequality.  
 
To take a step further from empirical literature on inequality which focus on GINI 
and to make the analysis more intensive empirically for the robustness of the results, this 
chapter also employs income deciles and percentiles derived from UNU/WIDER World 
Income Inequality Database (WIID) as other proxies of inequality. Institutions or 
integration will be guilty of inequality if it has a negative impact on the incomes of the 
bottom 10 per cent (low10) and positive impact on the income of the top 10 per cent 
(high 10). Income groups are also divided into quintiles anticipating the effect of 
institutions to be negative for the ratio between the top 20 per cent and bottom 20 per 
cent (high20/low20) and positive for the middle-income groups (Middle20) are included. 
The exercise on income deciles and percentiles will shed light on how institutions and 
integration relate to income distribution. Of special interest is how quality of institutions 
relates to the incomes of the middle-class or the ones living in the bottom income share. 
Each country observation for all inequality measures come from the last year for which 
data is available and in most cases represent inequality in the mid-1990s. Our basic 
inequality and income share equations would look like:
Inequality = f (Institutions, Integration, Geography) (1)
And Income Share= f (Institutions, Integration, Geography) (2)
Corresponding to Eq. (4.1), the inequality model based on Theil index has eight 
equations whereas each equation corresponds to a different institutional or integration 
classification. The model specifications for Gini, High20/Low20, Middle20, Low10 and 
High10 contain the same eight equations each with the same variable specifications. 
(3)iiii GeoOpenLITheil 11111  
(4)iiii GeoOpenPITheil 22222  
(5)iiii GeoOpenEITheil 33333  
(6)iiii GeoOpenSITheil 44444  
(7)iiii GeoTPLITheil 55555  
(8)iiii GeoTPPITheil 66666  
(9)iiii GeoTPEITheil 77777  
     (10)iiii GeoTPSITheil 88888  
The variable  is Theil index in a country i, , , , and are iTheil iLI iPI iEI iSI
respectively measures for legal, political, economic and social institutions, whereas 
measures general openness in the economy and  is a measure for trade policy iOpen iTP
and  is the random error term. Equations based on Gini, High20/Low20, Middle20, i
Low20 and High10 have similar specifications.
As discussed, there are potential endogeneity problems between institutions and 
integration and between institutions and inequality itself. Therefore the institutional, 
trade policy and openness proxies presented here were first regressed on a set of 
instruments. This chapter takes the same set of instruments which were used in chapter 2 
to instrument for openness/ trade policy, institutions and human capital which is 
considered as a social institution in this analysis. Frankel and Romer (1999) (FR) makes 
up for the instrument for all the outcome and incidence measures of trade barriers 
utilised in this chapter. FR instrument uses trade/GDP shares constructed based on a 
gravity equation for bilateral trade flows. 
Following, Hall and Jones (1999), the extent to which the primary languages of 
Western Europe are the first languages are taken as instruments for Legal, Political and 
Economic institutions. Hall and Jones argue that the instruments do not correlate with 
the error term. Though, it is good to briefly mention again that Acemolgu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) (AJR) identify the mortality of European settlers as a potential 
instrument. Using two ex post assessments of institutional quality—risk of expropriation 
by the government and constraints on the executive—as measures of institutions, they 
showed that settler mortality is a strong predictor of institutions. 
However, there are two drawbacks for the AJR instrument as mentioned in Mamoon 
and Murshed (2017). According to Glaeser et al. (2004a), AJR instrument of settler 
mortality fails to be orthogonal to the error term. ‘Settler mortality is strongly correlated 
not just with ancient, but also with the modern, decease environment, suggesting that it 
might be the decease environment, rather than history, that matters for economic 
development. Secondly, settler mortality is strongly correlated with human capital 
accumulation, suggesting that it cannot be used as an instrument for institutions.’ 
(Glasear et al. 2004a: 8) Also the data for AJR instrument is only available for 64 
countries. Although Rodrik et al. (2004) extended it to 80 countries; it still covers a 
relatively low number when compared to ‘the extent to which the primary languages of 
Western Europe are spoken as first languages today,’ which covers as many as 140 
countries.  
Since years of schooling for proxy for social institutions, dropout rates (drop90) and 
school days in a year (Schday) are employed as instruments.  As in Rodrik et al. (2004) and 
Hall and Jones (1999), ‘distance from the equator’, here is another instrument (proxy for 
geography) also employed by Hall and Jones (1999). The IV analysis in chapter 2 has 
already established the statistical validity of these instruments. However, here the 
instruments enter first stage of the analysis under slightly different specifications. For 
Legal, Political and Economic institutions, the regression models corresponds to 
specification in Mamoon and Murshed (2017) when human capital was absent. In this 
paper, Sch99 and Alter corresponds to Social institutions and thus a new specification has 
been introduced where Social institutions would enter different inequality equations with 
a combination of different outcome based (openness, Open) or incidence based (trade 
policy, TP) respectively. Following is the model specifications for first stage regressions 
based on instruments: 
(11)iiiii DisteqFREurEngLI 111111  
(12)iiiii DisteqFREurEngPI 222222  
(13)iiiii DisteqFREurEngEI 333333  
(14)iiiii DisteqFREurEngOpen 4444441  
(15)iiiii DisteqFREurEngTP 5555551  
(16)iiiii DisteqFRSchdayDropSI 666666 90  
     (17)iiiii DisteqFRSchdayDropOpen 7777772 90  
(18)iiiii DisteqFRSchdayDropTP 8888882 90  
Where  and  are the instruments for legal, economic and political iEng iEur
institutions referring to fractions of population speaking English and European 
languages respectively. Drop90 is Annua Drop out rates and Schday is number of schooling 
days. Both are instruments for average years of schooling and adult literacy rate.  an iFR
instrument for openness and trade policy.  a proxy for geography showing iDisteq
distance from the equator. At the second stage, the income share equations employ the 
predicted values of respective institutional, openness and trade policy variables. 
5. Results
5.1. 1st Stage Results:  
The first stage results are presented in table 3. All instruments seem to work quite well 
for the outcome based (openness) measures of trade barriers and high R-square and F-
statistic show that instruments significantly explain the variation in trade shares. However 
for incidence based (trade policy) measures of trade barriers, F-statistics have declined 
and range between 7 and 5. For tariffs on international inputs and capital goods (Owti), 
weighted average for total import charges (Totimpov85), Non-tariff barrier coverage 
(Nontarr87) and Sachs and Warners composite openness index (Open80), the FR 
instrument is significant. FR trade shares are weekly related with import duties (Tariffs) 
and trade taxes (Txtrdg). For NTBs, instruments are insignificant in all cases, while F-
statistics is mere 0.73. Instruments work quite well for Legal, Political, Economic and 
Social institutions with F-statistic much higher than 10, and high R2, while all 
instruments are significantly related with all institutional regressors. Low F-statistics for 
incidence based measures may indicate that instruments employed are weakly related 
with the regressors. 
Discussion on relevance and validity of instruments has already been carried out in 
chapter 2 and suggests that low F-statistics may not necessary confers to weakness of 
instruments. Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb of F-test to be equal to or greater 
than 10 for the good fit of instruments may only hold in case of one instrument and one 
regressor. When the number of instruments are moderate or large, higher order 
asymptotic tests, which are already proposed in Mamoon and Murshed (2017), needs to 
be carried out.  Higher order asymptotic tests include (1) obtaining Craag and Donald 
(1993) critical values to reject 2SLS bias and (2) Anderson-Rubin test of joint significance 
of endogenous regressors for relevance of instruments; (3) Hansen or Sargan over 
identification test statistics for erogeneity; and (4) Baum, Schaffer and Still’s 
recommended test for heteroskedasticity robust 1st stage estimate for reducing omitted 
variable bias. To carry out all these tests, the author refers to IV stage analysis where 
these higher order asymptotic testing is done and made it available for many of the 2SLS 
specifications which are run under Eq. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. In all these specification 
different definitions of inequality are utilised along with different specifications of Legal, 
Political, Economic, Social institutions and integration as regressors.
Table. 3. First Stage Regression
First Stage Results: Openness and Trade Policy
Nominal 
Trade 
share 
(lcopen)
Import 
penetratio
ns 1985 
(Impnov85)
Import 
penetratio
ns 1982 
(Impnov82)
TARS 
trade 
penetrati
on 1985 
(Tarshov
85)
TARS 
trade 
penetrati
on 1982 
(Tarshov
82
Import 
duties as 
% 
Imports 
(Tariffs)
Tariffs 
on 
internati
onal 
inputs 
and 
capital 
goods 
(Owti)
Trade 
taxes 
(Txtrdg)
Weighte
d 
average 
of total 
import 
charges  
1985
(Totimpo
v85)
Non 
trade 
barriers 
(Owqi)
Non 
tariff 
barriers 
1987
(Ntarov8
7)
Sachs 
and 
Warner 
openness 
1980
(Open80s
)
Lfrkrom 0.533 11.616 19.811 29.88 46.47 -1.02 -0.078 0.0048 0.3739 -0.036 -18.08 0.195
(11.5)*** (7.9)*** (7.2)*** (7.4)*** (4.0)*** (-0.8) (-3.4)*** (0.98) (3.0)*** (-0.9) (-3.0)*** (2.9)***
Engfrac 0.407 19.71 20.609 29.78 115.99 -1.49 -0.01 0.001 -0.113 -0.105 4.254 -0.018
(2.1)** (2.4)*** (2.2)** (2.0)** (2.9)*** (-0.3) (-0.1) (0.08) (-0.23) (-0.77) (0.17) (-0.08)
Eurfrac -0.208 -6.656 -7.67 -5.23 -4.598 -3.56 -0.067 -0.016 0.164 -0.006 -28.107 0.208
(-1.9)* (-1.23) (-1.21) (-0.53) (-0.17) (-1.30) (-1.29) (-1.63)* (0.67) (-0.07) (-2.3)*** (1.43)
Disteq -0.003 -0.015 -0.21 0.052 -0.534 -0.208 -0.002 -0.0007 0.022 -0.001 -0.238 0.010
(-1.26) (-0.14) (-1.60) (0.26) (-0.99) (-3.8)*** (-2.1)** (-3.8)*** (2.9)*** (-0.84) (-0.65) (3.6)***
N 122 82 84 85 82 85 85 52 66 83 83 54
F 39.00*** 18.54*** 15.98*** 15.56*** 7.12*** 5.47*** 5.36*** 5.09*** 4.57*** 0.73 7.21*** 7.44***
R2 0.57 0.49 0.44 0.43 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.30 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.38
First Stage Results: Economic, Legal, Political and Social Institutions
Voice and 
Accountabilit
y
(Va)
Political 
Stability
(Ps)
Government 
Effectiveness
(Ge)
Regulatory 
Quality (Rq)
Rule of law
(Rl)
Control for 
Corruption
(Ctc)
Democracy 
(Demo)
Autocracy
(Auto)
Average 
years of 
schooling, 
1999 
(Sch99)
Lfrkrom 0.154 0.234 0.229 0.081 0.238 0.254 0.364 0.108 -0.274
(2.0)** (2.7)** (2.9)*** (1.31) (3.8)*** (3.3)*** (0.83) (0.28) (-1.01)
Engfrac 0.621 0.395 0.573 0.324 0.586 0.832 2.623 -0.505
(2.0)** (1.09) (1.90)* (1.32) (1.9)* (2.7)*** (1.5) (-0.33)
Eurfrac 0.698 0.478 0.457 0.572 0.302 0.0326 4.79 -4.73
(3.7)*** (2.4** (2.5)** (3.8)*** (1.6)* (1.8)* (4.7)*** (-5.2)***
Drop90 -0.049
(-4.4)***
Schday -0.0092
(-0.68)
Disteq 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.014 0.031 0.030 0.085 -0.051 0.0761
(7.8)*** (6.3)*** (7.3)*** (4.8)*** (8.3)*** (8.3)*** (4.8)*** (-2.81)*** (4.8)***
N 122 116 117 122 122 118 108 108 85
F 27.1*** 40.4*** 22.2*** 14.4*** 24.9*** 26.6*** 16.4*** 12.7*** 22.1***
R2 0.48 0.59 0.44 0.31 0.46 0.49 0.38 0.33 0.52
- t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively
5.2. IV Results: 
 5.2.1. Relevance and Exogeniety of Instruments:
This section undertakes relevance and exogeniety tests under higher order asymptotic 
framework for the institutional and integration regressors for GINI, Theil, High20/Low20 and 
Mid20 some selected number of combinations of these regressors. Relvance and exogeniety 
tests are also carried out for Low10 and High10, but they are not presented here as the results 
obtained by former tests would already provide enough information to conclude whether 
instruments have worked well. 
Table 4 provide results for Gini Index. Instruments strongly pass the relevance test for any 
of the combinations of institutions and integration except for Owqi. Owqi fails relevance test 
for not only Gini Index, but also for Theil index in table 5, High20/Low20 in table 4.6 and 
Mid20 in table 7. This is expected as we already know from 1st stage results that all 
instruments have been insignificant in case of Owqi, while the F-statistic was approximating 
to 0. 
Instruments have been found to be weakly related with Taiffs for Theil99. For other 
dependent variables also like Gini, High20/Low20 and Mid20, the 2SLS bias in case of Tariffs 
is large. This is also in line with 1st stage results, where most instruments fail to significantly 
explain Tariffs with the only exception of Disteq. 
 The 2nd stage regressions have suffered more from the problem of endogeniety, especially in 
case of High20/Low20 and Mid 20  when ever, Legal, Political, Economic and Social 
institutions enter with outcome based (openness) measures of trade barriers. This brings us 
back to the analysis by Rodrik et al (2004), which was run on per capita income differences 
and problem of endogeniety was present in all regressions. High20/Low20 and Mid20 are 
also estimates of incomes but based on percentiles instead of taking incomes of all groups 
and utilising an average: as in case of per capita income which is average income of all 
households. The persistent of the presence of endogeniety in specifications where trade 
shares enter as a regressor indicates the increased possibility that such specifications may 
suffer from omitted variable bias. Nevertheless, no presence of 2SLS bias which is seen to 
approximate to 0, in all cases where openness is the regressor show that IV analysis is 
superior to simple OLS. 
In case of trade policy, exogeniety tests are generally passed for all those trade policy proxies 
which have also passed the Cragg-Donald maximal 2SLS bias test of relevance. Only in case 
of Theil99 few trade policy proxies such as Owti, Ntarfov and Open80s in addition to Owqi fail 
over-identification tests.  Though the presence of endogeniety between regressors and the 
error term is not good news for the empirical analysis, it has come as a good news for the 
theoretical validation of the very regressions which analyse the role of trade in determining 
wage inequality because it refutes the assertion put forward by Acemoglu (2002) that trade is 
only weekly related with technology bias which creates increase demand for skilled labor. 
Presence of endogeniety suggest that trade policies in both developed and developing 
countries are inter connected with the adoption of skill bias technologies  in more ways then 
what is generally perceived in literature. The theoretical discussion carried out in section 4.4 
to this effect also validates the above finding. Table 4, 5, 6 and 7 shows that for all 
combinations of regressors and for all dependent variables heterskedasticity robust estimates 
are utilised.
Table 4.  Multiple Tests for the Relevance and Quality of Instruments for Gini Index
Relevance Exogeneity
Endogenous Dependent Variable:
 GINI Coefficients in Percentage Points as calculated from 
consumption expenditure by WIDER (Gini)
N 1st 
Stage 
heteros
kedasti
city-
robust
Maxima
l 2SLS 
Bias (b)
Cragg-
Donald 
N*minEval 
stat.
Chi-sq(3)
Anderson-
Rubin test 
of joint 
significance 
of
endogenous 
regressors
F-Statistic
Sargan 
statistic 
(overidentifica
tion test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2)
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Institutions
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac)
1 Nominal Trade Shares, Voice and Accountability ( Lcopen, Va) 97 Robust 0.00 107.83** 4.95*** 0.063
(0.969)
2 Nominal Trade Shares, Political Stability ( Lcopen, Ps) 89 Robust 0.00 65.24** 4.83*** 0.170
(0.918)
3 Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness (Lcopen, Ge) 90 Robust 0.00 73.53** 5.03*** 0.146
(0.929)
4 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality (Lcopen, Rq) 96 Robust 0.00 68.52** 4.97*** 0.019
(0.988)
5 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 96 Robust 0.00 92.08** 4.79*** 0.116
(0.943)
6 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption (Lcpopen, Ctc) 92 Robust 0.00 69.77** 4.60*** 0.102
(0.9505)
7 Nominal Trade Shares, Democracy (Lcopen, Demo) 90 Robust 0.00 53.05** 5.05*** 0.031
(0.984)
8 Nominal Trade Shares, Autocracy (Lcopen, Auto) 90 Robust 0.00 46.43** 5.05*** 0.016
(0.992)
9 Nominal Trade Shares, Average Years of Schooling (Lcopen, Sch99) 73 Robust 0.00 74.84** 2.39* 1.072
(0.585)
10 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Impnov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 62.63** 2.49* 0.268
(0.874)
11 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Impnov82, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 95.07** 17.74*** 11.532
(0.0031)***
12 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Tarshov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 52.35** 2.49* 0.162
(0.922)
13 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Tarshov82, Rl) 68 Robust 0.00 73.80** 16.61*** 10.942
(0.004)***
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy, Institutions
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac)
14 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 71 Robust 0.37 3.14** 19.52*** 0.778
(0.677)
15 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of Law 71 Robust 0.078 6.79** 2.62** 2.28
(Owti, Rl) (0.319)
16 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 46 Robust 0.072 6.99** 18.20*** 0.943
(0.624)
17 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of Law 52 Robust 0.019 9.91** 0.92 0.06
(Totimpov85, Rl) (0.970)
18 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 70 Robust 0.846 0.81 3.30*** 0.928
(0.628)
19 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law (Ntarfov87, Rl) 52 Robust 0.042 8.27** 0.92 1.762
(0.414)
20 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, (Open80s, Rl) 48 Robust 0.00 7.97** 1.92* 3.45
(0.178)
t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively
Table 5. Multiple Tests for the Relevance and Quality of Instruments for Theil99
Relevance Exogeneity
Endogenous Dependent Variable: 
UTIP – UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure, 1999 (Theil99)
N 1st 
Stage 
heteros
kedasti
city-
robust
Maxima
l 2SLS 
Bias (b)
Cragg-
Donald 
N*minEval 
stat.
Chi-sq(3)
Anderson-
Rubin test 
of joint 
significance 
of
endogenous 
regressors
F-Statistic
Sargan 
statistic 
(overidentifica
tion test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2)
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Institutions
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac)
1 Nominal Trade Shares, Voice and Accountability ( Lcopen, Va) 122 Robust 0.00 113 3.92*** 1.738
(0.419)
2 Nominal Trade Shares, Political Stability ( Lcopen, Ps) 116 Robust 0.00 72.73 3.23** 1.058
(0.589)
3 Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness (Lcopen, Ge) 117 Robust 0.00 91.62 3.38** 1.46
(0.48)
4 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality (Lcopen, Rq) 122 Robust 0.00 58.87 3.54*** 1.69
(0.42)
5 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 122 Robust 0.00 101.83 3.54*** 1.72
(0.42)
6 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption (Lcpopen, Ctc) 118 Robust 0.00 107.42 3.30** 1.76
(0.41)
7 Nominal Trade Shares, Democracy (Lcopen, Demo) 108 Robust 0.00 68.23** 3.86*** 1.877
(0.391)
8 Nominal Trade Shares, Autocracy (Lcopen, Auto) 108 Robust 0.00 47.94** 3.86*** 1.393
(0.498)
9 Nominal Trade Shares, Average Years of Schooling (Lcopen, Sch99) 108 Robust 0.00 85.17** 6.85*** 2.647
(0.266)
10 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Impnov85, Rl) 85 Robust 0.00 75.48 5.28*** 1.094
(0.578)
11 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Impnov82, Rl) 84 Robust 0.00 60.64 4.87*** 0.981
(0.612)
12 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Tarshov85, Rl) 85 Robust 0.00 66.09 5.28*** 1.339
(0.511)
13 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Tarshov82, Rl) 82 Robust 0.00 28.20 5.08*** 0.329
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy, Institutions
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac)
14 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 85 Robust 0.71 1.37 6.46*** 6.289
(0.04)**
15 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of Law 85 Robust 0.06 7.41 4.86*** 5.596
(Owti, Rl) (0.06)*
16 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 52 Robust 0.08 6.74 3.47*** 4.23
(0.12)
17 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of Law 66 Robust 0.02 9.52 3.12*** 3.97
(Totimpov85, Rl) (0.13)
18 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 83 Robust 0.83 0.86 4.71*** 0.074
(0.96)
19 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law (Ntarfov87, Rl) 66 Robust 0.08 6.73 3.12*** 6.69
(0.03)**
20 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, (Open80s, Rl) 54 Robust 0.11 5.93 4.86*** 6.769
(0.033)**
t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively
Table 6.  Multiple Tests for the Relevance and Quality of Instruments for High20/Low20
Relevance Exogeneity
Endogenous Dependent Variable: 
Fifth Income Percentile/ First Income Percentile 
(High20/Low20)
N 1st 
Stage 
heteros
kedasti
city-
robust
Maxima
l 2SLS 
Bias (b)
Cragg-
Donald 
N*minEval 
stat.
Chi-sq(3)
Anderson-
Rubin test 
of joint 
significance 
of
endogenous 
regressors
F-Statistic
Sargan 
statistic 
(overidentifica
tion test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2)
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Institutions
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac)
1 Nominal Trade Shares, Voice and Accountability ( Lcopen, Va) 97 Robust 0.00 107.83** 8.65*** 9.459
(0.008)***
2 Nominal Trade Shares, Political Stability ( Lcopen, Ps) 89 Robust 0.00 65.24** 8.05*** 5.894
(0.052)**
3 Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness (Lcopen, Ge) 90 Robust 0.00 73.53** 8.41*** 5.815
(0.054)*
4 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality (Lcopen, Rq) 96 Robust 0.00 68.52** 8.33*** 12.546
(0.002)***
5 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 96 Robust 0.00 92.08** 8.33*** 5.237
(0.072)*
6 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption (Lcpopen, Ctc) 92 Robust 0.00 69.77** 8.10*** 10.155
(0.006)***
7 Nominal Trade Shares, Democracy (Lcopen, Demo) 90 Robust 0.00 53.05** 8.71*** 13.916
(0.001)***
8 Nominal Trade Shares, Autocracy (Lcopen, Auto) 90 Robust 0.00 46.43** 8.71*** 15.919
(0.0003)***
9 Nominal Trade Shares, Average Years of Schooling (Lcopen, Sch99) 73 Robust 0.00 74.84** 7.34*** 2.624
(0.269)
10 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Impnov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 62.63** 7.25*** 2.463
(0.292)
11 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Impnov82, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 95.07** 2.93** 2.415
(0.298)
12 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Tarshov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 52.35** 2.95** 2.378
(0.304)
13 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Tarshov82, Rl) 68 Robust 0.00 73.80** 2.78** 2.242
(0.326)
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy, Institutions
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac)
14 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 71 Robust 0.37 3.14** 5.92*** 1.563
(0.457)
15 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of Law 71 Robust 0.078 6.79** 9.75*** 3.829
(Owti, Rl) (0.146)
16 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 46 Robust 0.072 6.99** 8.16*** 1.956
(0.376)
17 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of Law 52 Robust 0.019 9.91** 5.55*** 4.602
(Totimpov85, Rl) (0.101)
18 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 70 Robust 0.846 0.81 9.02*** 1.497
(0.368)
19 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law (Ntarfov87, Rl) 52 Robust 0.040 8.27** 5.55*** 0.264
(0.876)
20 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, (Open80s, Rl) 48 Robust 0.046 7.97** 7.37*** 1.791
(0.408)
t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively
Table 7: Multiple Tests for the Relevance and Quality of Instruments for Mid20
Relevance Exogeneity
Endogenous Dependent Variable: 
Third Income Percentile (Mid20)
N 1st 
Stage 
heteros
kedasti
city-
robust
Maxima
l 2SLS 
Bias (b)
Cragg-
Donald 
N*minEval 
stat.
Chi-sq(3)
Anderson-
Rubin test 
of joint 
significance 
of
endogenous 
regressors
F-Statistic
Sargan 
statistic 
(overidentifica
tion test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2)
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Institutions
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac)
1 Nominal Trade Shares, Voice and Accountability ( Lcopen, Va) 97 Robust 0.00 107.83** 18.79*** 22.109
(0.000)***
2 Nominal Trade Shares, Political Stability ( Lcopen, Ps) 89 Robust 0.00 65.24** 19.45*** 13.469
(0.0012)***
3 Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness (Lcopen, Ge) 90 Robust 0.00 73.53** 19.49*** 14.334
(0.0008)***
4 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality (Lcopen, Rq) 96 Robust 0.00 68.52** 18.78*** 22.543
(0.000)***
5 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 96 Robust 0.00 92.08** 18.78*** 11.946
(0.0025)***
6 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption (Lcpopen, Ctc) 92 Robust 0.00 69.77** 18.41*** 13.925
(0.001)***
7 Nominal Trade Shares, Democracy (Lcopen, Demo) 90 Robust 0.00 53.05** 21.00*** 26.038
(0.000)***
8 Nominal Trade Shares, Autocracy (Lcopen, Auto) 90 Robust 0.00 46.43** 21.00*** 29.529
(0.000)***
9 Nominal Trade Shares, Average Years of Schooling (Lcopen, Sch99) 73 Robust 0.00 74.84** 26.10*** 0.380
(0.827)
10 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Impnov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 62.63** 16.67*** 7.951
(0.018)**
11 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Impnov82, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 95.07** 17.02*** 8.349
(0.015)**
12 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Tarshov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 52.35** 16.67*** 7.114
(0.028)**
13 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Tarshov82, Rl) 68 Robust 0.00 73.80** 16.96*** 7.855
(0.019)**
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy, Institutions
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac)
14 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 71 Robust 0.37 3.14** 19.37*** 0.997
(0.607)
15 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of Law 71 Robust 0.078 6.79** 22.43*** 3.910
(Owti, Rl) (0.142)
16 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 46 Robust 0.072 6.99** 16.92*** 0.297
(0.862)
17 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of Law 52 Robust 0.019 9.91** 6.77*** 8.673
(Totimpov85, Rl) (0.013)**
18 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 70 Robust 0.846 0.81 20.23*** 2.144
(0.342)
19 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law (Ntarfov87, Rl) 52 Robust 0.040 8.27** 6.77*** 1.037
(0.597)
20 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, (Open80s, Rl) 48 Robust 0.046 7.97** 21.25*** 3.783
(0.151)
t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively
5.2.2. Results on Institutions
Due to sheer number of specifications for which the regressions are carried out for six 
different dependent variables, it is not possible to present results for both institutions and 
integration together in single table. Thus, in order to cover all specifications, we discuss 
results by summarising them into different categories. First we provide results of institutions, 
divided into 4 categories as Legal, Political, Economic and Social. In later sections, results 
for integration would be separately discussed.
Table 8 provides detailed results on various definitions of institutions. It is observed that rule 
of law and control of corruption are the most relevant institutions that help create a more 
equal society in developed as well as developing countries. Democracy also ensures equality 
by following median voter hypothesis. In contrast, Government regulation is relevant for 
inequality mitigation but it is not the most important institution. These results fit nicely with 
the governance policies in developed and developing countries and their welfare outcomes. 
For example, in China inequality trends especially in manufacturing pays have been rising 
that can be partly explained by the Chinese government’s early emphasis on strengthening 
free market economic institutions by introducing property rights and promoting more 
competition domestically and internationally within the private sector. Corruption was 
rampant until recently, when President Xi government clamped down on corruption 
focusing on government officials. This step may enable China to have equal distribution of 
gains among Chinese population from private sector induced and export led economic 
growth. Mamoon and Murshed (2017) explains that focus on growth may have led countries 
like China to prioritise development of economic institutions over legal or political 
institutions because economic institutions are more closely related with economic growth. 
However, this trend has been changing recently. More and more governments are investing 
in the development of legal and political institutions. 
5.2.3 Results on Integration and inequality:
‘Globalisation and Inequality’ has recently become a hot topic of debate. Trade liberalisation 
is evidently among many of other pro-market measures, which countries take to integrate 
with world markets and thus benefit from factors like technological spill-overs. Effects of 
pro market measures like capital market integration and financial liberalisation has already 
been captured in the last section through variables like regulatory quality. The results show 
that, at best, a weak relationship is present between regulatory quality and income 
distribution or wage inequality. 
Mamoon and Murshed (2013) already establishes the importance of trade as a key variable of 
interest in understanding rise and fall in this measure of inequalities in developing countries. 
A brief discussion which has been carried out in earlier sections suggests that inequalities 
(especially skilled bias wage inequality) are also rising in developed countries and, other than 
indigenous technical bias, there may be some external factors, which may determine the 
rising trend in inequalities in developed countries, whereas international trade may be an 
important one of such factors. 
Since the inequality models analysed in this chapter many trade measures (both outcome 
based and incidence based), a rich set of information is obtained on the link between 
integration and income or wage inequality for both developed and developing countries. 
This section presents this information referring to many specifications already analysed in 
last section, while focusing only on institutions and their effects of inequality. Here the 
author will analyze the correlations between different measures of trade openness and trade 
policy with Gini and Theil99, while institutions would serve as control variables for the 
robustness of the results. The results on the relationship between trade and relative share of 
different income groups will not be covered here to avoid excess of information. 
Nevertheless, openness is found to be significantly related with incomes in developing 
countries. Branko (2005), using Panel data and under a more comprehensive model 
specifications by adding variables like foreign direct investment, looks at the impact of 
openness on the relative income shares of low and high deciles and finds that for poor (least 
developed) countries openness benefits the rich, whereas for countries who belong to 
relatively higher income groups within developing countries, openness does appear to favour 
poor and the middle class. 
Dollar (2005) undertakes a comprehensive study to investigate the effects of globalisation on 
poverty and inequality for the post reform period (1980). Apart from showing that poverty 
trends have declined in developing countries post 1980 reforms, the paper manages to find 
no general trend towards higher inequalities within developed and developing countries. In 
comparison, rise in inequalities is more pronounced in manufacturing sector pay, though 
wages only constitute a small part of household income in developing countries. The focus 
of Dollar (2005) has been on global inequality which he finds to be on declining trends. 
However, there are many studies who have refuted this claim (i.e, see Milanovic 2006; 2005; 
and Wade, 2004). The claims on significant poverty reduction amidst high growth rates in 
developing countries has also been refuted since many studies are able to show that 
excluding India and China from the sample may capture rising trends in poverty in many 
developing countries. Whether developing countries, who faced increasing trends in poverty, 
have been unsuccessful globalisers and categorising India and China as success stories of free 
market reform is a generalisation which can then easily be questioned and thus the claim that 
‘globalisation has been pro poor’. ( Milanovic, 2003) 
In this section, the author would look at the issue of within country income inequality and its 
relationship, if any, with international trade while controlling for Legal, Political, Economic 
and Social institutions which have been analysed in last section.
Table 9; show the results for openness with income inequality. There is no evidence of a 
significant relationship between openness and within country income inequality except for 
two cases (columns 3 and 4). Institutions are significantly and negatively related with income 
inequalities. Reducing the sample to developing countries only makes insignificance of trade 
more pronounced.  The relative significance of institutions has also declined. Nevertheless, 
social institutions captured by average years of schooling, significantly decrease inequality for 
developing countries and the relationship is significant at 5% level. High values of 
coefficients for Sch99 suggest that education is highly effective in inequality mitigation.  
Further confidence comes from the statistical validity of the results for Sch99 because model 
specifications (coloumn 6 and 12) with Sch99 do not suffer from endogeiniety which has 
been observed in case of Rl, Va or Ge. (All such cases are highlighted in grey) Another 
interesting observation comes forth. For a larger sample, including developed and 
developing countries, democracy is significantly and negatively related with the Gini, telling 
that democracies are more likely to put a downward pressure on income inequality. However 
when the sample is reduced for developing countries only (columns 9 and 10), the signs 
change in favour of autocracy. Now democracy is positively and significantly related with 
Gini and autocracy, which was insignificant for the larger sample, is significantly and 
negatively related with inequality. The result is simple to interpret. Democracies in 
developing countries are associated with higher income inequality and autocracies are 
associated with less income inequality. There are several reasons why democratic experience 
in developing countries is related with higher income inequality and why autocracies may in 
fact show a negative relationship.  First and foremost, there is a direct link between 
democracy and higher inequality because there is evidence that transition to a democracy in 
many developing countries have produced political instability, ethnic conflict and resultantly 
poor economic outcomes. (Kaplan, 2000; Zakaria, 2003; and Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005) In 
literature there is also a distinction between real democracy (Populist democracy) and 
oligarchic society. (Acemoglu, 2003b) In real democracy, the political power is more equally 
distributed among different social and income groups of the society and thus the poorer 
segments can use their political voice to implement pro poor tax system in the country. Also 
in a real democracy, implementation of property rights prevent barriers to entry as against 
oligarchic society, which may look like a democracy by holding elections but political power 
lies with economic elites who create monopoly positions in the domestic markets for their 
businesses and violate property rights. In this context, an autocratic set up, where the leaders 
have effectively implemented property rights and significantly improved the level playing 
field for all social groups to carry out good business practices, may lead to decrease in 
income inequality. (Glaser et al, 2004a; and 2004b) Secondly, as explained by Gradstein et al 
(2001), culture and social value system also has a very important role to play in inequality 
mitigation: ‘ For Muslim, Buddhist/ Hindu and Confucian societies, democracy has either hardly 
discernible, or even a positive, effect on inequality. Yet these societies seem to possess some 
features which make them intrinsically more equal that the Judeo-Christian societies. It could be 
- although our empirical test does not account for that -that, the same “desired” level of 
inequality which in the Judeo-Christian societies is achieved through expanded franchise and 
government-sponsored redistribution , is implemented in the Muslim, Buddhist/Hindu, and 
Confucian societies, informally, through family and ethnic ties.’ (p35)
The results in table 9 and 10 give credence to such analysis because results for Demo and 
Auto do not change even if Africa is excluded from the developing country sample.  Instead, 
the results become more pronounced (columns 13, 14, 27 and 28), with improved 
coefficients and significance level for both Demo and Auto to suggest that the cause of 
unequal distribution of resources in developing countries is much more than the risky 
transitions to democracy as is also suggested by Rodrik (2005). It seems to matter what kind 
of democracies these developing countries implement and practice and what kind of 
societies they make up. 
Table 10, shows the results based on trade policy (Owti). They are similar to the ones already 
discussed above for Lcopen. For the larger sample of developed and developing countries, 
decrease in tariffs rates on international inputs and capital goods bring a significant decrease 
in income inequality. However, the as for Lcopen, results remain highly case sensitive. Owti is 
only significant for 2 (columns 17 and 18) specifications out of total number of 14 
specifications including the ones which represent results for reduced samples (developing 
country only).  On basis of these results we cannot claim with surety that trade is 
significantly related with income inequality. 
 Insignificant results on the relationship between trade and inequality should not be taken as 
evidence in favour of globalisation or against it. What the results at best show is that the very 
construction of Gini, and related methodological problems (also mentioned at the start of 
the chapter), have a part to play in these results. Further more, despite the sophistication of 
the analysis, the major deficiency in the kind of analysis done in this section would remain 
the very limited number of observations utilised for Gini against to what has been available 
by WIDER dataset. The author only includes one yearly observation for every country to 
best suite the cross section methodology employed in this manuscript. That has significantly 
decreased the degrees of freedom. This could have been avoided under a Panel analysis. For 
a Panel of countries, observations for Gini go as high as 5313. 
However, it is also important to note here is that a panel analysis may not necessarily lead to 
different results as many studies (i.e, Dollar, 2005) have already utilised such methodology to 
find no evidence of significant relationship between trade and income inequality. Yet again, 
such results can always be questioned on the basis of model specifications and certain case 
sensitivities. Finally, similar to Dollar (2005), our results contribute to the empirical debate 
and motivate further research into this topic. 
Table 11 presents results for wage inequality. It is clear that general openness indicators as 
well as trade policy measures lead to higher wage inequality in both developed and 
developing countries. However the only exception is import taxes. Implementing import 
taxes by protecting local industry has egalitarian effects. This is in line with recent literature 
on premature de industrialisation that suggests that developed countries have witnessed rise 
in inequality partly explained by active globalisation that has reversed industrialisation and 
thus causing political and economic upheavals in favour of anti globalisation movements.
Table: 9 Gini and Openness (Lcopen)
Dependent Variable : Gini
Dependent Variables
(Developed + Developing) (Developing Only)
(Developing Only) Minus 
Africa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Openness
Nominal Trade Shares (Lcopen) -0.49 -2.11 -4.71 -5.22 1.22 -0.59 -0.59 -1.08 -0.10 1.33 -1.26 0.67 -0.93 1.09
(-0.2) (-0.8) (-1.6)* (-1.8)* (0.4) (-0.19) (-0.2) (-0.3) (-0.03) (0.37) (-0.3) (0.1) (-0.2) 0.27
Institutions
Legal 
Rule of law(Rl) -7.30 -6.44
(-5.0)*** (-1.3)
Political
Voice and Accountability (Va) -5.46 1.40
(-4.0)*** (0.5)
Democracy (Demo) -0.71 1.35 2.28
(-1.8)* (2.4)** (3.2)***
Autocracy (Auto) 0.369 -1.59 -2.80
(0.7) (-2.6)** (-3.5)***
Economic
Government Effectiveness (Ge) -8.60 7.64
(-5.0)*** (0.9)
Social 
3.80 -4.27Average years of schooling 
(Sch99) (-2.7)*** (-2.2)**
N 95 96 89 89 89 72 70 71 66 66 64 52 44 44
F-Statistics 13.27*** 8.96*** 3.14** 1.67 12.62*** 9.16*** 0.88 0.21 2.87* 3.35 0.44 2.27 5.10* 6.10
R-Square 0.16 0.14 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.36 0.34
2SLS Bias 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.208 0.009 0.000 0.000
Sargan (p) 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.876 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.011*** 0.025** 0.000*** 0.817 0.072* 0.187
***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively; Standard errors corrected for as run Durbin–Wu–Hausman     test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993)
Table: 10 Gini and Trade Policy (Owti)
Dependent Variable : Gini
Independent Variables
(Developed + Developing) (Developing Only)
(Developing Only) 
Minus Africa
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Trade Policy
-30.05 3.73 56.50 66.69 -48.34 16.57 -25.02 -18.61 -9.18 -12.46 -32.26 -1.29 3.38 -0.69Tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital 
goods (Owti) (-1.04) (0.2) (1.9)* (2.4)** (-1.1) (0.6) (-1.1) (-1.10) (-0.5) (-0.7) (-1.1) (-0.1) (0.1) (-0.03)
Institutions
Legal -0.45 -7.13
Rule of law(Rl) (-3.5)*** (-1.3)
Political
Voice and Accountability (Va) -5.80 2,61
(-2.0)** (0.80)
Democracy (Demo) 0.33 1.31 2.34
(0.4) (2.2)** (2.5)**
Autocracy (Auto) -1.13 -1.68 -3.01
(-0.9) (-2.5)** (-2.8)***
Economic
Government Effectiveness (Ge) -13.23 -4.01
(-2.8)*** (-0.58)
Social 
Average years of schooling (Sch99) -2.77 -3.29
(-2.6)*** (2.1)**
N 70 71 68 51 68 59 53 54 51 51 51 44 34 34
F-Statistics 17.07*** 11.80*** 3.57** 2.79* 13.57*** 14.13*** 0.98 1.22 2.79* 3.26** 0.64 2.12 3.16** 3.88**
R-Square 0.18 0.18 0.59 0.15 0.48 0.06 0.45 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.40 0.57 0.06 0.52
2SLS Bias 0.073 O124 0.155 0.027 0.166 0.051 0.041 0.001 0.027 0.019 0.144 0.029 0.181 0.123
Sargan (p) 0.036** 0.000*** 0.002** 0.037** 0.028** 0.346 0.027** 0.005*** 0.038** 0.092* 0.009*** 0.504 0.185 0.336
***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively; Standard errors corrected for as run Durbin–Wu–Hausman     test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and 
MacKinnon. 1993
Table 11: openness / trade policy (All Specifications)
                                                                                                 Dependent Variable: Theil index
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I n s t i t u t i o n s  s e r v e  a s  c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e s   a n d  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  p a r e n t h e s i s  b e l o w
( V a ) ( R l ) ( C t c ) ( R q ) ( G e ) ( P s ) ( D e m o ) ( A u t o ) ( S c h )
Independent Variables
Nominal Trade Shares (Lcopen) 0.032 0.036 0.039 0.029 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.035 0.013
(1.54) (1.68)*** (1.77)*** (1.39) (1.82)*** (1.78)*** (1.70)*** (1.41) (0.89)
Import Penetrations (Impnov85) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0002
(2.66)* (2.87)* (2.88)* (2.48)** (3.01)* (2.86)* (2.57)* (2.28)** (0.38)
Import Penetrations (Impnov85) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.0002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0003
(2.68)* (2.91)* (2.92)* (2.63)* (3.06)* (2.93)* (2.67)* (2.41)** (0.42)
TARS trade penetration (Tars85) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0001
(2.84)* (3.06)* (3.08)* (2.66)* (3.24)* (3.06)* (2.75)* (2.44)** (0.32)
TARS trade penetration (Tars85) 0.0005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0002
(2.62)* (2.56)* (2.65)* (2.44)** (2.74)* (2.59)* (2.20)** (1.98)** (0.43)
Sachs and Warners Openness (Open80s) 0.007 -0.033 -0.025 -0.062 0.052 0.030 -0.007 -0.047 0.047
(0.51) (-0.41) (-0.28) (-0.08) (0.46) (0.28) (-0.09) (-0.84) (0.60)
-0.004 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.006Tariffs on intermediate inputs and 
capital goods (Owti) (-0.34) (0.80) (0.89) (1.11) (0.55) (0.37) (-0.96) (-0.63) (0.81)
Trade taxes (Txtrdg) -0.230 -0.324 -0.302 -0.149 -0.425 -0.366 -0.136 -0.058 -0.129
(-1.34) (-1.53) (-1.50) (-0.86) (-1.78)*** (-1.63) (-0.96) (-0.49) (-0.86)
Total  import charges (Totimpov85) 4.810 2.281 2.504 4.509 2.986 2.441 5.713 4.364 1.079
(1.50) (1.84)*** (1.91)*** (1.63) (1.75)*** (2.03)** (1.46) (1.39) (1.76)***
Non trade barriers (Owqi) -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(-2.32)** (-1.82)*** (-1.70)*** (-2.31)** (-1.84)*** (-2.04)** (-2.56)* (-2.33)** (-1.18)
Non trade barriers (Owqi) -0.800 -1.082 -1.243 -0.522 -1.101 -1.010 -0.487 -0.264 0.050
(-1.03) (-0.92) (-0.85) (-0.98) (-0.95) (-0.94) (-1.01) (-0.94) (0.27)
Non tariff barriers (Ntarfov87) -0.002 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(-1.64) (-0.82) (-0.26) (-1.66)*** (-1.04) (-1.30) (-2.09)** (-2.12)** (-0.73)
-*, **, *** corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively
- Control variables are in parentheses
6. Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the effects of different institutions on inequality. Although the 
literature is limited on the subject, what there is, suggests that there are two-way causalities 
between institutions and inequality. To explore this it was necessary to solve the problem of 
endogeneity by utilising a rich set of instruments and employing higher order validation 
techniques of relevance and exogeniety, and thus a very fine econometric analysis is carried 
out to understand the role of good institutions, which represent a vast set of legal, political, 
economic and social outcomes, in inequality mitigation and redistribution. Further more, the 
rich model specification also enabled the analysis to shed light on the link between trade and 
inequality which is also subject of great interest for many studies lately. 
The results reconfirmed that good quality institutions lead to decreases in inequality. It also 
appears that voice and accountability and political stability are more important than 
democracy. In line with previous studies, the current findings suggest that it may not matter 
much whether a country is working under a democracy or autocracy if it is about income 
inequality, but good policies enacted by the country’s leaders determine the welfare-
enhancing effects through preservation of property and other rights. Good leadership, which 
not only follows more market friendly policies,  also keeps institutional development at the 
fore of their policy choice and is keen for economic development to succeed. For 
developing countries, transition to democracies also comes with higher risks of political 
stability which in turn lead to greater income inequality. Culture and social set up capture 
democratic outcomes more than democracy itself in developing countries. Societies who 
highly value equality may redistribute income from rich to the poor even if the larger 
political set is autocratic in the country. However, autocracies are significantly related with 
wage inequality, where as democracies may pay higher wages on average in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Table 8 summarises the results of institutions based on relative significance, and shows that 
rule of law, control for corruption, political stability, government effectiveness and education 
are the key institutional outcomes which if secured can ensure equal societies. If education is 
more equally distributed among the population, relative wages of skilled and unskilled labour 
will have the least amount of distortions, especially when the country opens up to 
international trade. Among economic institutions, regulation is less important when 
compared to government’s independent fiscal and monetary policy, its effective capacity to 
decentralise and its pro-business orientation. Table 8 also shows that the middle-class comes 
out to be the main beneficiary of good quality institutions over any other income group as 
Middle20 equations give the most significant results. 
Regarding integration, the findings indicate that openness generally relates to higher wage 
inequality, although its impact on income inequality is relatively insignificant. This result is 
also in line with recent literature. However, the findings strongly suggest that levels of trade 
or trade policies may carry significant positive effects on wage inequality. Especially, 
international competition by revoking import taxes lead to higher wage inequality. To 
remedy for rising wage inequalities in developing countries, the analysis favour more regional 
trade among developing countries where trade may bring labour intensive technical change 
in the economies of participant countries as has been the case in Europe, where countries 
trade among each other more due to the EU (European Union), when in comparison with 
U.S.  For example, in countries like China and India, the pace of development suggest that 
both countries are fast climbing the technology ladder and would form significant pockets of 
services’ sector-oriented high technology dependent production areas, which may draw 
similarities with developed nations in both supply and demand and relative factor prices. 
Trade within developing countries may seek to exploit such emerging pockets. Countries like 
Pakistan may also increasingly join in if regional economics is a priority and conflicts of 
interest are resolved or set aside for preparation of economic grounds for social harmony 
within their populations.
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Table 8 Significance count of institutions
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables
Gini Theil High20/Low20 Middle20 Low10 High10
Cases of 
Significance  by 
rows
Total cases of 
correct signs
Legal Institutions
Rule of Law (Rl)
    (Negative sign)
10 out of 12
(10 out of 10)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
9 out of 12
(9 out of 9)
10 out of 12
(0 out of 10)
9 out of 12
(0 out of 9)
10 out of 12
(10 out of 10)
53 out of 72
 
53 out of 53
Control of Corruption (Ctc)
    (Negative sign)
9 out of 12
(9 out of 9)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
8 out of 12
(8 out of 8)
9 out of 12
(0 out of 9)
8 out of 12
(0 out of 8)
9 out of 12
(9 out of 9)
48 out of 72 48 out of 48
Economic Institutions
Government Effectiveness (Ge)
    (Negative sign)
8 out of 12
(8 out of 8)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
8 out of 12
(8 out of 8)
9 out of 12
(0 out of 9)
8 out of 12
(0 out of 8)
8 out of 12
(8 out of 8)
46 out of 72 46 out of 46
Regulatory Quality (Rq)
    (Negative sign)
4 out of 12
(3 out of 4)*
3 out of 12
(3 out of 3)
2 out of 12
(2 out of 2)
6 out of 12
(0 out of 6)
1 out of 12
(1 out of 1)*
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
21 out of 72 19 out of 21
Political Institutions
Political Stability (Ps)
    (Negative sign)
9 out of 12
(9 out of 9)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
8 out of 12
(8 out of 8)
9 out of 12
(0 out of 9)
8 out of 12
(0 out of 12)
9 out of 12
(9 out of 9)
48 out of 48 48 out of 48
Voice and Accountability (Va)
    (Negative sign)
7 out of 12
(7 out of 5)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
7 out of 12
(0 out of 7)
2 out of 12
(1 out of 2)*
7 out of 12
(7 out of 7)
33 out of 72
 
31 out of 33
Democracy (Dem)
    (Negative sign)
5 out of 12
(5 out of 5)
3 out of 12
(3 out of 3)
4 out of 12
(4 out of 4)
7 out of 12
(0 out of 7)
1 out of 12
(1 out of 1)*
5 out of 12
(4 out of 5)*
25 out of 72 23 out of 25
Autocracy (Aut)
    (Negative signs)
1 out of 12
(1 out of 1)
3 out of 12
(0 out of 12)
0 out of 12
(0 out of 0)
3 out of 12
(3 out of 3)
2 out of 12
(0 out of 2)*
2 out of 12
(2 out of 2)
11 out of 72 9 out of 11
Social Institutions
Average Schooling Years (Sch)
    (Negative sign)
11 out of 12
(9 out of 9)
9 out of 12
(9 out of 9)
6 out of 12
(6 out of 6)
6 out of 12
(0 out of 7)
5 out of 12
(0 out of 5)
6 out of 12
(6 out of 6)
43 out of 72 43 out of 43
Cases of Significance (by columns) 64 out of 120 51 out of 120 51 out of 120 68 out of 120 47 out of 120 62 out of 120 - -
- *  Observation made that a variable has entered the equation significantly but with a wrong sign
- Significance is observed at 1%, 5% and 10% levels
Country List for Gini
Aruba
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Burundi
Belgium
Burkina Faso
Bangladesh
Bulgaria
Belarus
Bolivia
Brazil
Central African Republic
Canada
Chile
China
Cote d'Ivoire
Cameroon
Colombia
Costa Rica
Czech Republic
Germany
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Algeria
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Spain
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
United Kingdom
Georgia
Ghana
Guinea
Gambia, The
Guinea-Bissau
Equatorial Guinea
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana
Hong Kong, China
Honduras
Croatia
Hungary
Indonesia
India
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Jordan
Japan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kyrgyz Republic
Cambodia
Korea, Rep.
Lao PDR
St. Lucia
Sri Lanka
Lesotho
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Latvia
Morocco
Moldova
Madagascar
Mexico
Malta
Mongolia
Mozambique
Mauritania
Malaysia
Niger
Nigeria
Nicaragua
Netherlands
Norway
Nepal
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
Poland
Portugal
Paraguay
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
El Salvador
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Sweden
Swaziland
Thailand
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Tanzania
Uganda
Ukraine
Uruguay
United States
Uzbekistan
Venezuela, RB
Vietnam
Yemen, Rep.
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Country List for Theil99
Afghanistan
Angola
Albania
Netherlands Antilles
United Arab Emirates
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Burundi
Belgium
Benin
Burkina Faso
Bangladesh
Bulgaria
Bahrain
Bahamas, The
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Barbados
Bhutan
Botswana
Central African Republic
Canada
Chile
China
Cote d'Ivoire
Cameroon
Congo, Rep.
Colombia
Cape Verde
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Germany
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Algeria
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Eritrea
Spain
Ethiopia
Finland
Fiji
France
Gabon
United Kingdom
Georgia
Ghana
Guinea
Gambia, The
Guinea-Bissau
Equatorial Guinea
Greece
Guatemala
Hong Kong, China
Honduras
Croatia
Haiti
Hungary
Indonesia
India
Ireland
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Iraq
Iceland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Jordan
Japan
Kenya
Kyrgyz Republic
St. Kitts and Nevis
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Liberia
Libya
Sri Lanka
Lesotho
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Latvia
Macao, China
Morocco
Moldova
Madagascar
Mexico
Marshall Islands
Macedonia, FYR
Malta
Myanmar
Mongolia
Northern Mariana Islands
Mozambique
Mauritania
Mauritius
Malawi
Malaysia
Namibia
Nigeria
Nicaragua
Netherlands
Norway
Nepal
New Zealand
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
Poland
Puerto Rico
Korea, Dem. Rep.
Portugal
Paraguay
French Polynesia
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Senegal
Singapore
Solomon Islands
El Salvador
Somalia
Sao Tome and Principe
Suriname
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Sweden
Swaziland
Seychelles
Syrian Arab Republic
Togo
Thailand
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Tanzania
Uganda
Ukraine
Uruguay
United States
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
Venezuela, RB
West Bank and Gaza
Samoa
Yemen, Rep.
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep.
South Africa
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Country List for Weighted Average of total Import Charges, 1985(Totimpov85) (Available for Developing Countries Only)
Angola
Argentina
Antigua and Barbuda
Burundi
Benin
Burkina Faso
Bangladesh
Bahrain
Bahamas, The
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Barbados
Central African Republic
Chile
China
Cote d'Ivoire
Cameroon
Congo, Rep.
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cayman Islands
Algeria
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Ghana
Guinea
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Hong Kong, China
Haiti
Indonesia
India
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Sri Lanka
Morocco
Madagascar
Mexico
Malawi
Malaysia
Nigeria
Nicaragua
Nepal
Oman
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Qatar
Sudan
Senegal
Singapore
Sierra Leone
El Salvador
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Tanzania
Uganda
Uruguay
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Venezuela, RB
Yemen, Rep.
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Country List for Non Tariff Barrier Coverage, 1987 (Nontarr87)
(Available for Developing Countries Only)
Angola
Argentina
Antigua and Barbuda
Burundi
Benin
Burkina Faso
Bangladesh
Bahrain
Bahamas, The
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Barbados
Central African Republic
Chile
China
Cote d'Ivoire
Cameroon
Congo, Rep.
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cayman Islands
Algeria
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Ghana
Guinea
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Hong Kong, China
Haiti
Indonesia
India
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Sri Lanka
Morocco
Madagascar
Mexico
Malawi
Malaysia
Nigeria
Nicaragua
Nepal
Oman
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Qatar
Sudan
Senegal
Singapore
Sierra Leone
El Salvador
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Tanzania
Uganda
Uruguay
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Venezuela, RB
Yemen, Rep.
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Zambia
Zimbabwe
